The October 2026 Google Cloud London outage revealed that a single zone failure can disrupt banks, courts, and couriers even when other zones remain online. This editorial examines how IT leaders must map hidden dependencies, define failover authority, and align protection spending with actual business impact before the next incident occurs. By Justin Sharrocks.
On 20 October, a power event took Google Cloud’s europe-west2-b zone offline. Although one of three zones in the London region, its failure disrupted Revolut, HSBC, DPD, Royal Mail, and the video platform for remote court hearings in England and Wales. Google’s preliminary report found secondary failover and queuing delays across infrastructure that had not lost power, underscoring that infrastructure resilience does not automatically equal business resilience.
The first architectural question is dependency mapping. A zone can be isolated while an application spanning several zones still depends on just one of them. Databases, message queues, identity services, DNS, and third-party software may all sit in a single zone, exposing the entire service. The same risk applies to suppliers: a payment provider or SaaS tool running in the affected zone will impact your customers even if your own infrastructure is elsewhere. Leaders should follow a customer journey for their most critical service, recording every component’s region and zone, then ask each supplier the same questions.
Authority, cost, and rehearsal determine whether migration is actually possible. Google advised customers to move workloads “if feasible,” but feasibility depends on pre-made decisions. Someone must be named and empowered to trigger failover. Standby capacity and replicated data carry costs that require budget holder agreement in advance. Finally, untested plans contain assumptions that surface only under pressure. A simple rehearsal during working hours, with someone keeping time and someone taking notes, reveals true recovery times and unclear roles. Good read!
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